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How many adults should live in a house? How do people actually divide themselves up 
among households?  Average household sizes vary substantially, both over time and in the 
cross-section.  In New York City, we find that housing and income maintenance policies exert 
powerful influences on household size and composition -- more powerful than race, culture, or 
ethnicity.  These policies make households smaller (measured by number of adults).  We review 
arguments why governments might want to influence household sizes, and discern no reason for 
trying to make households smaller than they would be in the absence of these housing and 
income maintenance policies.  Small average household size can be extremely expensive in 
terms of physical and environmental resources, higher rents, and possibly homelessness.  Our 








Almost all people care deeply about how many people they live with and who those 
people are.  In this paper, we ask whether housing policies and other social policies influence the 
decisions that people make about household composition.  We conclude that they do.  Generally, 
these policies cause New York households to be smaller than they would otherwise be, where 
size is measured by number of adults.  Many housing policies make explicit reference to 
household size, and so in part our results are not surprising.  Housing authorities and homeless 
assistance units have precise rules about acceptable apartment sizes for different families, 
depending on size, age composition, gender mix, and relationships.  Overcrowding is one of the 
ills that housing programs are supposed to alleviate, and so we expect some effect on household 
size.  Yet we also find that other policies, like the rules of the food stamp program, exert strong 
influences on how households form, even though their stated goals have little to do with 
household composition. 
We believe this paper begins to fill a serious gap in the study of housing markets.  
Housing researchers have paid almost no attention to household formation.  Almost all 
theoretical housing models and academic debates about homelessness and housing policy take 
household composition as exogenous, even though it is clearly a matter of personal choice. 
This omission is perhaps all the more surprising given how much these decisions matter. 
If households across the United States contained as many people as those in Queens, the nation’s 
entire population could be housed without using any of the housing in either Texas or New 
Mexico.  Put another way, given that the U.S. housing stock is currently valued at over $10 
trillion, it’s not a bad approximation to say that Americans have invested $1 trillion in leading 
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more solitary lives than the people of Queens.1  Whether that trillion dollars has been well spent, 
and conversely, whether the people of Queens would be better off if they lived more like other 
Americans, seem to us sufficiently important questions that household composition should not be 
considered exogenous.  
In this paper, then, we begin to explore how subsidies and regulations affect decisions 
about household composition, and in particular about how many adults live in a household.  Like 
the other papers in this volume, we focus on the case of New York City.   
We start with descriptive statistics about households in New York City and in the nation. 
 The size of the average household in the United States has shrunk dramatically over the last 
several decades.  We show the ways in which New York households differ from national 
averages, and how households in the different boroughs differ from each other.  The key 
conclusion is that average household composition varies greatly over time as well as space.  
There is plenty of variation that needs explaining. 
In the second section, we describe some of the major public policies that might affect 
household size and composition, both directly and indirectly.  We demonstrate that a wide 
variety of government policies take aim, intentionally or not, at living arrangements.  The third 
section considers the determinants of household size and composition more generally and 
generates some testable hypotheses about how different policies might shape living 
arrangements. 
                                                 
1 In 2000, total residential fixed assets in the U.S. amounted to $10.7 trillion (U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2001). 
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Section 4 is the empirical heart of the paper.  Drawing on data from the Social Indicators 
Survey for New York City, we use Poisson regressions to learn what determines household size, 
testing the predictions from section 3.  The results are striking.  Housing and social policies have 
effects on household size that are both statistically and economically significant.  This result 
holds when we use two different measures of household size -- the number of adults and the 
number of adults other than the head of household's partner.  Food stamp receipt, section 8 
participation, and public housing tenancy all make households smaller; public assistance receipt 
may also do so. (Collinearity makes it difficult to parcel out independent effects of these 
programs.)  To give one example, we find that the typical household receiving a Section 8 rental 
subsidy has 9 percent fewer adults than comparable households who do not receive such a 
subsidy.  Just as surprising as the strong confirmation of economic theory in these regressions is 
the weak role that race, culture, and ethnicity play, once income and program participation are 
controlled for.  These variables are rarely significant. 
Finally, we turn from positive analysis to normative.  We ask why we do not all live 
alone, why we do not congregate in one enormous commune, and what sorts of market failures 
might keep household sizes from being optimal.  Implicit in many of the social policies that are 
described below, for instance, is the idea that people left to their own devices will sort 
themselves into households sub-optimally.  We review the literature to see what evidence there 
is that larger households impose costs.  We find no reason for thinking that New York City 
households would be systematically too big or too small in the absence of housing policies and 




1.  How New Yorkers Live 
The first two columns of table 1 compare the composition of the average household in 
2000 in New York City with that in the United States as a whole.  While there is little difference 
between the total numbers of people living in the average New York City household and the 
average household in the United States, the mix of people differs greatly.  Households in New 
York City contain many more adults and many fewer children.  Moreover, the adults living in 
New York’s households are typically not spouses or partners, but more typically adult sons and 
daughters, more distant relatives, and non-relatives.  Consider that New York City households 
contain an average of 0.54 adults who are neither a spouse nor partner of the householder; in the 
United States as a whole, households include an average of only 0.36 such adults.  (These are not 
trivial numbers: the U.S. had 105.5 million households in 2000, and 0.36 adults per household 
means over 36 million people.)  Similarly, New York households have more kids who are not 
children of the householder and fewer kids who are.  Put simply, New York households have 
more of the people who might live elsewhere and fewer of the people who have traditionally 
lived together. 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
Table 1 also contrasts the borough with the smallest households, Manhattan, and the 
borough with the largest, Queens.  Manhattan households are far smaller than the national 
average; Queens households far larger.  But even Queens households have fewer spouses and 
own children of the householder than the national average, and even Manhattan households have 
more non-relative adults and unmarried partners than the national average. 
Table 2 compares New York City with the remainder of the Consolidated Metropolitan 
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Area. The contrast is very similar to the contrast with national averages.  Households in the 
suburbs have more spouses and minor children of the householder but fewer others.  Suburban 
New York households include an average of 0.44 adults who are neither spouse nor partner of 
the householder--about halfway between the City and U.S. averages. 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
A quick look at households in other large cities demonstrates that New York City is not 
an extraordinary outlier among big cities.  Table 3 shows that households in seven of these cities 
are actually larger than those in New York City and three contain more adults who are neither a 
partner nor a spouse of householder.  In Los Angeles, the typical household is in fact larger than 
that in Queens (though it has fewer adults).  New York appears to look the most like Los 
Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit.  The other cities have large households too - but much of their 
large size is accounted for by the presence of children, partners, or spouses of the householder. 
Certainly, New York City’s households are not large compared to the other large central 
cities within the New York metropolitan area.  Households in New York City are actually 
smaller on average than households in any of the six other cities with over 100,000 people,  and 
they have fewer adults who are not spouses or partners of the householder than households in 
four of these other cities.  
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
Table 4 shows how household size and composition changed between 1990 and 2000.  
Average household size grew in New York, but fell in the rest of the nation.2  Even Manhattan 
                                                 
2There is some reason to believe that the growth in household size in New York City may 
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households got a little bit bigger, while the growth in Queens was considerable -- the typical 
Queens household went from 2.68 people to 2.81 people.  Among adults, the pattern of change in 
household composition looks pretty similar across areas: fewer spouses and adult children, more 
of everything else.  The number of children of both kinds grew in New York, but fell in the 
nation.    
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
Table 5 provides a longer, national time series on household size.  Between 1940 and 
2000, average household size in the U.S. fell by 29 percent, and the number of adults per 
household fell by 24 percent.  The trend is monotonic.   One might presume that this trend is due 
to the aging of the population -- that is, the population is getting older and older people are more 
likely to live alone.3  But such aging in fact accounts for only a small share of the increase.4  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
have been even greater than Table 2 indicates.  The 2000 Census records a gain between 1990-
2000 of approximately 200,000 households, while city records only indicate that only about 
80,000 new housing units were built over the decade.  Many observers attribute this discrepancy 
to a reduction in the undercount.  If small households were more likely to be overlooked in 1990 
(smaller things being more difficult to find), and less likely to be undercounted in 2000, then the 
actual growth in New York City households size was considerably larger than that shown in 
Table 2.    
3While older individuals may also be more likely to live in two-person households, the 
increase in households made up of two people over this time period was far more modest than 
the gain in single person households.  Between 1960 and 2000, the proportion of two-person 
households rose by 19 percent, in comparison to the 95 percent gain in the proportion of one-
person households. 
4Consider the share of households with only one person - which swelled from 13.1 
percent of the population in 1960 to 25.8 percent in 2000.  To test how much of this increase was 
due to an increase in the proportion of older households, we estimated the percent of single-
person households that would have existed in 2000 had the proportion of households with 
individuals 65 and over been the same in that year as it was in 1960.  Had this proportion 
remained steady, we estimate that the share of households living alone in 2000 would have been 
24.8 percent - only slightly smaller than the actual percentage.     
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actual likelihood of living in smaller households, controlling for age, seems to have increased 
over these decades.  
TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
How significant are these time series and cross-sectional contrasts?  The introduction 
pointed out that if all Americans shared housing the way people in Queens do, we could manage 
without several large states or about a trillion dollars worth of investment.  Another way to 
underscore the social and economic significance of these differences is to point out that with far 
smaller increases in size, U.S. households could easily absorb the homeless population.  In fact, 
if existing households took in the full population of homeless people in the U.S., average 
household size would probably increase by less than 0.01 persons (from 2.59, say, to 2.60).  
In short, these tables show tremendous and significant variation in household size and 
composition over time and space.  Even within a single city, we see large contrasts.  In the next 
sections, we explore the extent to which public policies, and housing policies in particular, might 
contribute to this variation.   
 
2.  Public Policies Affecting Household Size and Composition 
Official concern about appropriate living arrangements is legislated into numerous laws 
and regulations in the United States.  Many of our social policies, as well as many provisions in 
our tax code, favor certain arrangements over others.  This section outlines many of the ways 
that social policies and tax policies give preference to different households and reviews the 
evidence on their influence on actual behavior.  We then consider the ways in which housing 





The food stamp program is one of the mainstays of New York City's welfare state.  
Among means-tested programs only medical insurance and school lunches have more recipients, 
and the food stamp program spends considerably more money than school lunches (refer to Irv 
paper).  The program has several provisions that discourage large households. 
The maximum monthly allotment is not proportional to household size; instead, 
additional household members raise the monthly allotment by decreasing amounts.  Income 
eligibility limits follow the same pattern: if two people whose income makes them each eligible 
individually form a household, that household's income may be above the guidelines for a 
family of two.  Households with more than $2,000 in assets are also ineligible--no matter how 
big the household is.  The food stamp benefit that a household actually receives is the difference 
between the maximum monthly allotment and 30 percent of the amount the household has 
available to spend on food.  The calculation of how much is available to spend on food 
disadvantages larger households in three ways: first, because every household receives the same 
standard deduction from its income regardless of size; second, because the deduction for child 
care is capped at the same amount regardless of the number of children in the household; and 
third, because households that pay more than half of their net income on rent get to deduct this 
added amount from the total available to buy food. 
The interaction between all these provisions can be very powerful, especially among 
low-wage earners in a high-rent city like New York.  Consider two individuals, each earning 
$550 a month and paying $300 a month for a room.  Living alone, they would each receive 
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$74.30 a month in food stamp benefits (using fiscal year 1998 parameters).  If they moved in 
together and shared an apartment with $500 a month rent, the food stamp benefit for the 
combined household would amount to only $38.30.  Together they would lose $110.30 a month 
in food stamps--more than they saved in rent.5  
                                                 
5To give another example, consider two parent-child households, each earning $900 a 
month and paying $500 a month in rent and $150 a month in child care (the child being more 
than two years old).  Each household on its own would get $177.80 a month in food stamps.  But 
together with a rent of $700 a month and $250 in child care expenses, they would get only 
$109.20.  Joining together would cost them $246.40 in food stamp benefits.   
These strong incentives in favor of small households are somewhat mitigated by 
regulations that allow some individuals who live together to be treated as two separate 
households for food stamp purposes.  A brother and sister who live together, for instance, can be 
treated as two separate households for food stamp purposes, provided that they purchase and 
prepare food separately.  The same is true for two unrelated individuals.  But the opportunity for 
people living together to be counted separately is limited.  Boarders cannot qualify separately.  
Husbands and wives, parents and children under 21, and minors under 18 living with persons 
exercising parental authority are all barred from separate application.  These are some of the 
most popular ways of forming households.  Households that want to save time and money by 
buying and preparing meals together, or who value the experience of shared meals, are also 





The link between welfare assistance and living arrangements has long been debated, with 
many charging that welfare assistance, especially in its former incarnation - Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) - encourages people to remain single and have children out of 
wedlock (Murray 1984).  Under AFDC, two-parent families could receive limited or no benefits 
and women with more children were awarded larger allowances than those with fewer children.6 
                                                 
6In the past, some states cut two-parent families from the welfare rolls if one parent 
worked more than 100 hours per month, regardless of income or needs.   Many also required one 
parent in a two-parent family to have a work history in order to qualify for benefits.   
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While the evidence about influences on actual behavior is mixed (see Moffit 1998), 
living arrangements were certainly a key objective of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA).  Among the stated purposes of the act was to promote ... 
marriage, to encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families, and to 
provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in 
the homes of relatives.  Certainly, many provisions aimed directly to discourage pre-marital 
childbearing - the law, for instance, permitted states to enact family caps which freeze benefit 
levels and provide no additional funds if a woman has another child while receiving welfare.7 
But if the welfare reform law aimed to decrease the number of children living in poor 
households, it has generally favored an increase in the number of parents and other adults.  Most 
directly, it has allowed states to relax restrictions on two-parent families (Acs and Nelson 2001). 
 In addition, the time limits, work requirements, family caps, stepped-up child support 
enforcement introduced -- or permitted -- through the welfare reform law make single-parent 
households less attractive.   
The promotion of two-parent families (and marriage) is also a central goal of the Bush 
Administration’s proposal to reauthorize the 1996 legislation.  Under the Bush plan, states must, 
as part of their state plan, describe their efforts to promote healthy marriages as part of their state 
                                                 
7Evidence on effectiveness of caps is mixed - Camasso et al. (1998) find that the family 
cap led to reduced births among welfare recipients in New Jersey, but Turturro, Benda, and 
Turney (1997) find no effects in Arkansas.  Two studies using national data on individuals 
suggest that family caps have little effect on fertility (Acs 1996; Fairlie and London 1997).    
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plan and to provide equitable treatment of two-parent, married families (White House 2002). 
What has welfare reform meant in New York?  On the one hand, the state has relaxed 
restrictions on two-parent families applying for welfare (Acs and Nelson 2002).  In other 
respects, New York’s public assistance programs still appear to favor small households.  The two 
major public assistance programs in New York are the Family Assistance Program (FAP--the 
New York name for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) and Safety Net Assistance (the 
New York name for general assistance). The maximum benefit per capita (including shelter 
allowance) decreases sharply as household size increases.  Per capita maximum public assistance 
benefits for a family of four are 44 percent of per capita maximum benefits for a family of one 
(HRA Facts, 2002).  The comparable figure for food stamps is 84%.  The asset limit and the 
earnings disregard for public assistance are also independent of household size, as with food 
stamps, so that they are less beneficial to households with more adults.8 
New York public assistance programs also discourage recipients from living with 
wealthier step-parents or grandparents.  Any income these individuals have over $442 a month is 
"deemed" to be available to the recipients, and their grant is reduced accordingly (Urban 
                                                 
8Part of the New York public assistance grant is a shelter allowance equal to actual rent, 
up to a maximum.  If the cap were not binding, this would strongly discourage larger households, 
since economizing on rent is one of the more important reasons to form a larger household.  But 
the caps are usually not binding (74.3 percent of public assistance households received the 
maximum shelter allowance in June 1999 [HRA Facts, 2002]), and so the shelter allowance 




Institute, 2002).  On the other hand, FAP forbids 16-year-old and 17-year-old parents from 
forming their own households.  Such minor parents must live with a parent or guardian of their 
own if they are to receive benefits.  This provision in part offsets many of the other provisions in 
the public assistance programs. 
Evidence about the impact of welfare reform on living arrangements is just emerging.  
Acs and Nelson (2001) find that during the late 1990s (i.e., post welfare reform), the share of 
families composed of a single mother with children declined and the share of families made up 
of couples with children increased.  They find further that these changes were greater for low-
income and less educated families  the families, that is, most likely to be affected by welfare 
reform.  This provides some support for the idea that the welfare reform law has contributed to 
larger numbers of adults per household, though the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
may have played a role too (see below).  In a subsequent paper, the authors find further evidence 
that certain provisions of the welfare reform law -- family cap policies and more aggressive 
collection of child support -- are correlated with declines in single parenting and increases in 
two-parent households (Acs and Nelson 2002).  
Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2002) also find evidence that welfare reform has had an 
effect on living arrangements among some subgroups.  Among Hispanic children and black 
children living in central cities, for instance, their results suggest that reform has led to a 
decrease in the proportion living with an unmarried parent.  But effects vary widely across 
subgroups and across states, so it is difficult to draw any links between specific policies and 
particular outcomes.  In summary, public assistance may still encourage smaller households, but 
these studies suggest that these incentives are less powerful than before.  
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Supplemental security income 
Although it is talked about far less, Supplemental Security Income for the aged, blind, 
and disabled (SSI) is actually a larger program in New York City than traditional public 
assistance (see Irv’s paper).  This program also encourages smaller households.  The incentives 
come partly from the structure of benefit payments.  As is the case with food stamps, payment 
per person is less for larger households of eligible individuals.  The incentive extends to 
households where recipients are living with ineligible individuals, too.  When this happens, SSI 
"deems" part of the ineligible person's income to be available to the recipient, and reduces the 
recipient's benefits accordingly. 
Child Protection 
Foster care is another example of a social policy that likely favors smaller households.  In 
order to provide care for foster children, households must meet licensing requirements in their 
state.  Standards vary, but applicants in all states must demonstrate that they can provide a safe 
living environment and adequate bedroom space to accommodate the child (Connect for Kids).  
Applicants are required to disclose the names of all persons who will be living with the foster 
child and most states require a home inspection to assess the likely living arrangements (National 
Foster Parent Association, Inc.).  In New York State, the home or apartment must have separate 
bedrooms for children of the opposite sex over four years of age, and no child above the age of 
three can sleep in the same room with an adult of the opposite sex (Neff 2001).  These 
restrictions likely make it difficult for larger households to participate.  
Tax Policy 
The treatment of marriage and children has also been central in recent debates about tax 
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reform.9  Since the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which established a separate tax schedule for single 
persons, critics have charged that the tax code penalizes married couples, who through filing 
jointly, face higher marginal tax rates.10  Republicans in Congress have recently proposed 
several bills to address this marriage "penalty."  In reality, the story is more complicated because 
many couples may receive a bonus from marriage, depending in large part on the couple’s 
relative earnings (CBO 1997).  It is possible that the winners outnumber the losers.  Alm and 
Whittington (1996) demonstrate that while the magnitude of the marriage tax is highly sensitive 
to the method of calculation, the different measures all suggest a rise in the penalty in recent 
years.       
As for actual effects on behavior, James Alm and Leslie Whittington have written several 
papers on the topic and find consistent evidence that taxes influence both the timing of marriage 
as well as the marriage (and divorce) decision itself (Alm and Whittington 1995; Alm and 
Whittington 1997; Alm and Whittington 1999).   In their most recent paper, they estimate that 
for women, the elasticity of the probability of marriage with respect to the marriage penalty (the 
                                                 
9For a comparative perspective, see Pechman and Engelhardt (1990), who offer a review 
of the tax treatment of the family in 11 industrialized countries.   
10The tax code also arguably encourages fertility.  First, the federal government provides 
an exemption for dependents, which effectively lowers the cost of having a child.  Whittington, 
Alm, and Peters (1990) find a positive and significant relationship between the tax value of the 
exemption and the national birth rate.  Their estimates of elasticity range from 0.127 to 0.248.  A 
ten percent increase in the value of the exemption, in other words, would raise the current 
fertility rate by between 1.3 and 2.5 percent - or add more than 50,000 new births.  Second, the 
government also provides tax credits for families with children, which were recently increased in 
the Tax Relief Act of 2001.  Third, the federal government allows working parents to pay for 
child care and dependent care expenses without taxes being withheld. 
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increase in tax liability a woman faces when she marries) is -0.23.11   If the marriage penalty for 
women were to increase by 10 percent, that is, this would decrease the probability of marriage 
for the average woman by 2.3 percent. 
 
Earned Income Tax Credit 
                                                 
11Marriage tax/subsidy can differ for women and men.  On average, it is larger for 
women because they typically have lower earnings.  
During the Clinton Administration, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was expanded 
dramatically.  Like the income tax, the program’s treatment of marriage is complex.  In general, 
the EITC provides a strong marriage bonus for single, non-working parents and a large marriage 
penalty for single parents who are working.  Ellwood (2000) finds that the majority of families 
face penalties.  Yet, he finds little evidence that these incentives have had much of an effect on 
marriage.  He finds modest evidence that they have encouraged cohabitation, at least among 
older women.  
 
Housing Policy  
Living arrangements are perhaps most central to U.S. housing policies and practices.  
From at least the time of Jacob Riis and other Progressive Era reformers, policy makers in this 
country have had a concern in this country about the crowded living conditions of the poor.  Riis 
and his fellow reformers worried that overcrowded housing bred disease and ill morals.  In their 
eyes, bad housing made bad people.  Riis described overcrowded tenements, as the day-to-day 
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nurseries of crime and of the vices and disorderly courses which lead to crime (Riis YEAR). 
Such beliefs were embodied in the first tenement law of 1901, which legislated that every 
adult and child be allotted a minimum amount of space.  Specifically, the act provided that each 
adult have 400 cubic feet of air and each child under 12 have 200 cubic feet of air.  According to 
reformer Lawrence Veiller, this privacy provision was written to discourage the practice of 
tenants taking lodgers and boarders into their apartments (Friedman 1968, p. 35).    
New York City’s housing code continues to stipulate such restrictions.  Today, the city’s 
housing code requires that each adult living in rental housing have at least 80 square feet of 
living space (hallways and bathrooms are not counted in floor space).   In addition, the code 
prohibits families from renting rooms to more than two boarders, roomers, or lodgers. 
Subsidized housing programs are even more restrictive, both in New York and around the 
country.  The guidelines typically target persons per room - but given the distribution of 
available units, they effectively constrain household size.  To get into public housing or to obtain 
a Section 8 voucher to help with rent payments, for instance, an applicant must provide a list of 
all persons who would be living in the housing unit, their sex, date of birth, and relationship to 
the family head.  In the case of public housing, the housing authority will then put the applicant 
on the waiting list and notify her if an apartment becomes available that the housing authority 
deems to be sufficiently large to comfortably accommodate her family.  In the case of Section 8 
housing, applicants are notified when an apartment becomes available, but they are required to 
rent an apartment that the housing authority deems large enough for the family.   
Table 6 summarizes the occupancy standards employed by the New York City Housing 
Authority (NYCHA).  As noted, the guidelines embody certain assumptions about social 
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acceptability, gender mixing, etc.  Strictly applied, they suggest that no more than two people 
may share a bedroom and that with the exception of partners, people of opposite gender may not 
share a bedroom.  To give one example, a two-parent family with a son and a daughter cannot 
use a Section 8 voucher to move into a two-bedroom apartment.   
The Department of Homeless Services in New York also has guidelines for acceptable  
living arrangements.  When an applicant for emergency shelter reports that her family’s previous 
residence was overcrowded, the agency is required to investigate this claim.  The agency will 
then arrange for a visit to determine whether or not the location remains appropriate and 
available to the family (and therefore the family is ineligible for assistance and must stay in the 
housing unit).  
The actual guidelines used are similar to those used by NYCHA, but they are somewhat 
less strict.  For instance, that same two-parent family with a son and a daughter could rent a two-
bedroom apartment if the children were under the age of 12 or if the living room had 
appropriate sleeping accommodations.  The agency also finds it acceptable for as many as 
four children to share a room, as long as every child has a bed and the entrance to the room is 
unobstructed.  Unacceptable features include shared sleeping rooms by children of different 
sexes over the age of 12; shared sleeping rooms by unrelated adults of different sexes, excluding 
those involved in an ongoing partner relationship; shared beds by a greater number of persons 
than intended for normal use; shared beds by unrelated adults, excluding those involved in an 
ongoing partner relationship (New York City Dept of Homeless Services 2002) 
 
3.  Determinants of Household Size 
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In this section we consider the determinants of household size, with a particular focus on 
the role of housing policy.  We concentrate on the number of adults per household.  The central 
question is as follows: Given a fixed number of adults, how do they sort themselves into 
different households?   We are developing a detailed way of answering this question in another 
paper and will present a summary of the analysis here. 
The model in that paper omits from consideration two important classes of people: 
children and potential immigrants (both into New York City and out of it).  We leave direct 
consideration of children out of the model for two chief reasons.  First, children cannot form 
households on their own; the decision to invite more children into one’s household or to bring 
them in does not therefore directly affect the total number of households or the number of 
required housing units in turn.  The policy implications are thus quite distinct.  Second, children 
are rarely permitted to make decisions for themselves about which households they will join.  
We abstract from migration considerations in the other paper merely to simplify notation. 
Thinking about migration is an easy extension. 
Rent levels are one consideration in sharing decisions.  Because of economies of scale in 
housing, it is cheaper to share housing than it is to live alone. And when rents are higher, the 
advantage of sharing is greater.  Thus, we expect to see a greater proportion of sharers when rent 
levels are higher.  More sharing, in turn, means less demand for housing stock.  Sharing 
decisions thus produce a downward-sloping demand curve for housing units as a function of rent. 
 Equating supply with demand produces both an equilibrium rent and an equilibrium average 
household size.  When we think about policies, we will think about how they shift demand and 
supply curves, and how these shifts perturb the equilibrium. 
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Ceteris paribus, we expect adults with lower incomes and lesser wealth will be more 
likely to share housing.  While they might wish for greater solitude, it comes at too great a price 
in terms of forgone consumption of other goods. 
Holding rents constant, people also have different tastes for sharing housing, or rather 
different preferences for living alone.  Tastes for sharing may be correlated with demographics.  
Most clearly, we expect that immigrant households should have a greater number of adults, 
because they face a higher price for housing in terms of forgone non-housing consumption.  
Certain ethnic groups may also be more apt to choose multi generational living arrangements and 
therefore live in households with a greater number of adults (Geronimus 1997). 
People also have attributes that make them more or less attractive roommates to others.  
Consider the net effect that children have on the number of adults in a household.  On the one 
hand, the presence of children may make an adult caregiver eager for helpers, and so be willing 
to sacrifice in other dimensions to bring other adult caregivers into the household, or to keep 
them there.  On the other hand, some adults may find that a household with children in it affords 
them less peace, quiet, and solitude than an otherwise similar household without children, and 
therefore be less eager to join that household or to stay in it.  Thus we do not have a strong prior 
belief on whether the presence of children increases the number of adults in a household or 
reduces it. 
Various social policies also contribute to decisions about sharing housing, through 
lowering or raising the cost of caring for older dependents, living with a partner/roommate, or 
being married.  Certain policies subsidize households to stay small.  The food stamp, TANF, 
SSI, and section 8 programs are all good examples.  The market effect of these programs 
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depends on how their beneficiaries would have behaved in the absence of the program.  To the 
extent that people choose to live in smaller households than they would otherwise, these 
programs shift the demand curve for housing to the right.  At any given rent, more housing units 
are demanded and households are smaller on average. 
The elasticity of housing supply determines whether this demand shift translates into 
higher rents or a larger housing stock.  Inelastic housing supply--the likely short-run response--
means higher equilibrium rents.  These high rents mean that other sharers replace the would-be 
sharers who received government subsidies and average household size stays the same. Notice 
that this is inefficient: sharers who find sharing less distasteful are replaced by sharers who find 
it more distasteful.   
In the longer run, housing supply is much more elastic and builders will create a larger 
equilibrium housing stock to accommodate the greater demand for housing units.  This is also 
inefficient: the benefits that the subsidized small households gain from being small are less than 
the cost of constructing additional housing. 
On the other hand, these programs do not move the demand curve for housing if they do 
not induce any households to be smaller than they would otherwise be.  For instance, if section 8 
vouchers go exclusively to people who would live in small households anyway, the vouchers are 
merely transfers to those households and have no further implications in the housing market.  
One of the goals of the empirical research, therefore, will be to try to gauge the extent to which 
food stamps, public assistance, and section 8 make recipients act differently. 
The analysis of public housing is similar.   Only 26 percent of the apartments in New 
York City’s public housing developments have more than two bedrooms and only four percent 
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include more than three bedrooms (NYCHA documents).  The guidelines in table 6 thus severely 
reduce the eligibility of large households.  Ex post doubling up is also strongly discouraged.  The 
effect on the demand curve is just the same as the effect of section 8 and food stamps: to the 
extent that public housing induces some households to be smaller than they would be otherwise, 
it shifts the demand curve out. 
Public housing differs from those programs, however, because it also affects the supply 
curve: more units are available at any (private market) rental.  If (private) housing is supplied 
perfectly elastically, this makes little difference: public housing crowds out private, equilibrium 
rents don’t change, but the final housing stock is bigger because demand has shifted out.  With a 
less elastic supply curve, part of the supply effect of public housing is translated into lower rents-
-more precisely, rents lower than the demand shift by itself would have caused.  Since with 
inelastic supply the demand increase raises rents, the overall effect on rents--and hence on 
sharing by people who are not admitted to public housing--is ambiguous.  Empirically, then, it is 
important to find the extent to which admission to public housing affects household size, since 
the shift in the housing demand curve is a key variable. 
Two other parts of the New York City welfare state also shift the housing demand curve 
out, but do so indirectly.  These are rent control and Jiggetts relief.   Jiggetts relief grew out of a 
1997 lawsuit in which a state judge found that New York’s shelter allowance (the part of the 
welfare grant set aside for rent) was so low that families living on public assistance could not 
afford to live in New York City.  Until the State implements a shelter allowance that is adequate 
in New York City, the judge ordered that the state pay for part or all of the ongoing rent for 
families on public assistance who are at risk of eviction for not paying their rent (Community 
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Service Society 2002). 
These programs operate primarily through an income effect.  Their recipients have 
greater income after paying their rent, and so may be expected to acquire more of every normal 
good, including the peace, serenity, and security attendant to small household size.  Rent control 
adds a further constraint against moving, since a household that moves loses the low rents that 
rent control produces. Often, joining a larger household entails moving, since the larger 
household will use more space or because the household one is joining stays put, and the 
constraint against moving may also discourage rent-controlled households from growing in size. 
 Fear of being accused of violations that could result in loss of lease may also discourage rent-
controlled households from taking in boarders, friends, or relatives. 
To the extent that these considerations lead Jiggetts recipients and rent-controlled tenants 
to live in smaller households than they would otherwise, the demand curve for housing units 
shifts out.  All the market effects of section 8 and food stamps follow.  So we will also try to 
gauge the effect on household size of Jiggetts and rent control. 
The other major housing program in New York City are the series of measures that lower 
the cost of homeownership, particularly the ownership of detached single family homes. 
Homeowners (regardless of physical structure) in the U.S. receive favored federal tax treatment 
and therefore face effectively lower housing prices.  Moreover, in New York City, the property 
tax burden on 1-3 family homes (class one properties) is far lower than that for larger residential 
buildings (class two).  The key is the assessment ratio.  Properties in New York City are not 
assessed at their full market value, but only at some proportion of that market value.  The 
assessment ratio applied to the fair market value of a class one property is currently just 8 
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percent, while that applied to larger buildings is 45 percent (City of New York 2002, p. 42).  
There are also caps on the rate of growth of assessments for class one properties and smaller 
class two properties.  Increases in assessments for class one properties are limited to six percent 
per year and 20 percent over five years.  For class two properties of under 11 units, annual 
assessments are restricted to eight percent per year and 30 percent over five years.  For larger 
class two properties, there are no restrictions on assessment increases (City of New York 2002, 
p. 42).   
The effects of these programs are more difficult to analyze.  We think of these programs 
as supply side programs--the subsidy is attached to the housing unit, not to the persons 
occupying it.  Since owner-occupied and single-family houses are generally larger than other 
kinds of housing units,12 the subsidy in our model (developed in more detail in the other paper) is 
attached to physically  larger rather than smaller housing units. 
                                                 
12In 1999, the average single-family home in New York City was 1,581 square feet; the 
average apartment in rental buildings with more than 3 units was just 893 square feet.  (Source: 
authors calculations from New York Citys RPAD file, an administrative data set gathered for 
the purpose of assessing property taxes.  Note that mixed use properties are excluded and mean 
square footage in multifamily buildings includes common space.)  
It is most convenient to think about the implications of such a subsidy in a world with 
two markets--big houses and small houses.  The subsidy to big houses reduces the price in that 
market (except in the highly unlikely case of totally inelastic supply), which induces some 
households already living in big houses to get smaller, and some people originally living in small 
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houses to shift to big.  This shift of people from small houses to big moves the demand curve for 
small houses down, which reduces the equilibrium price of small houses.  Households originally 
living in small houses get smaller, too. 
The overall effect of the subsidy on household size is ambiguous, however.  There are 
three kinds of people: those who live in small houses regardless of subsidy, those who live in 
large houses regardless of subsidy, and those whom the subsidy induces to move from small 
houses to large.  Among the first two groups, the subsidy causes household size to fall, since it 
cuts the price of housing for them.  Among the third group, however, household size is unlikely 
to fall for anyone and it may rise for some.  This rise in average household size among switchers 
from small to large houses may or may not be large enough to offset the decline in the first two 
groups. 
The regressions that we present in the next section show that homeownership, 
particularly ownership of a single-family home, is associated with larger household size.  But 
this association does not necessarily imply that encouraging homeownership encourages larger 
households. 
 
4. Empirical Tests of Household Size 
As noted above, the empirical analysis in this paper is focused on New York City.  Using 
a pooled sample of households from the 1997 and 1999 Social Indicators Survey, we undertake a 
cross-sectional analysis of household size.  It is worth underscoring here that with cross-
sectional data in a single city, we are limited in our ability to identify causal relationships.  
Moreover, we cannot test how the introduction of subsidies in a market is likely to alter 
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equilibrium household size.  However, we can test a number of hypotheses outlined above - most 
notably, we can see the extent to which receipt of housing subsidies and participation in income 
transfer programs is correlated with smaller households.    
We focus on two dependent variables: number of adults per household; and number of 
adults in the household, other than the spouse or partner of respondent.  We consider these 
variables separately because the decision to take on a roommate may be influenced by somewhat 
different considerations than the decision to get married or to live with a partner.  Characteristics 
that make someone a highly attractive spouse may not be as relevant to a roommate, and while 
many have a preference for sharing housing with a partner or a spouse, fewer actually prefer 
having a roommate.  For example, while higher incomes and receipt of subsidies might lead to 
fewer non-spousal adults in households, such factors may not affect the presence of a partner or 
spouse. 
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis.  We include 
four categories of independent variables.  The first set of variables are demographic, since, as 
noted above, tastes for sharing may also be correlated with demographics.  This includes race, 
nativity, and number of children.  As shown, the sample is about 60 percent minority and 38 
percent foreign-born.  The second category covers socioeconomic status - here we consider 
average income per adult in the household (averaged over respondent, his or her partner/spouse 
if present, and any other adults for whom income is reported) and average asset levels - again 
averaged over adults for whom assets are reported.   
The variables most central to the analysis are the dummy variables that indicate 
participation in various types of income and housing subsidy programs.  As shown, ten percent 
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of households receive public assistance, 13.7 percent receive food stamps, and 4.3 percent 
receive SSI.  As for housing assistance, approximately one quarter of survey households live in 
rent controlled apartments, while another 14 percent either live in public housing or receive 
Section 8 vouchers to subsidize their rent.  We also consider whether a household owns their 
housing unit and whether the household lives in a house (i.e., 1-3 family home) as opposed to an 
apartment.  As noted, homeowners and residents of smaller buildings receive favored tax 
treatment in New York City.  Roughly one third of households live in 1-3 family homes and 30 
percent own their homes.   
Finally, when considering the number of adults other than a spouse or a partner in the 
household, we also include a variable indicating the presence of a partner or spouse.  This allows 
us to test whether these other adults serve as substitutes in part for spouses or partners.  
(Moreover, many of our independent variables are correlated with the presence of partner or 
spouse -- i.e., children, subsidies, homeownership.)  Just over half of respondents have a partner 
or spouse living with them.   
TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
Before moving onto regressions, Table 8 shows the mean number of adults and non-
spousal adults for a number of different household types.  The first thing to notice about table 8 
is that not one of these differences is statistically significant at conventional levels.  The 
contrasts, therefore, are meant only to be suggestive.  In the first column, we look at the total 
number of adults per household.  Looking at the demographic variables, the major differences 
seem to be between immigrants and non-immigrants (or between the ethnic groups who have 
been in New York City longer and those heavily represented among more recent arrivals).  
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Immigrant households have more adults, and assisted housing households have fewer.  
 Households with children tend to have a greater total number of adults, although not 
more adults who are neither parents nor partners/spouses of parents.  As for income, households 
with average incomes (averaged over adults) above the sample median tend to have fewer adults.  
TABLE 8 AROUND HERE 
Participation in transfer programs appears to make some difference.  Households that 
received some welfare payments or food stamps in the last year are smaller than those who did 
not.  Finally - housing appears to matter too.  Rent controlled households have somewhat fewer 
adults, and housing subsidies appear to make an even larger difference, with assisted households 
having fewer adults.  There also appears to be a difference between homeowners and renters.  
Households that own their homes have more adults, and those who live in houses (as opposed to 
multifamily apartments) appear to have more still. Finally, the presence of a partner or spouse in 
the household is linked to a greater total number of adults in a household, but to a smaller 
number of other adults.  
We have used Poisson regressions on pooled 1997 and 1999 SIS data to test some of the 
predictions from section 3.13  The first set of regressions, shown in Table 9, models the number 
of adults in a household other than the respondent. We show results with and without assets 
included, since the sample size falls when this variable is included.  We also show results with 
and without homeownership and house variables, since the regressions answer somewhat 
different questions.  Consider the coefficient on rent control.  With the ownership variable 
                                                 
13As a test, we also estimated these regressions using OLS, and the results were 
qualitatively the same. 
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included, this coefficient shows the extent to which households living in rent-controlled 
apartments are smaller than other renter households.  This is a valuable question, but it 
effectively assumes that ownership decision was already made at some point in the past.  In fact, 
ownership decision may be jointly determined with rent control (decision to own is affected by 
availability of rent-controlled apartment), and thus it may be more appropriate to ask whether 
households in rent-controlled apartments are smaller than all households.   
The second set of regressions, shown in Table 10, models the number of adults other than 
the respondent and his/her partner or spouse and include most of the same independent variable. 
 (The one difference is the inclusion in models 2-5 of a variable indicating the presence of a 
partner or spouse.)  
Starting with table 9, it is worth pointing out that none of the coefficients on the race and 
nativity variables is statistically significant in any of the regressions.  What appears to matter 
instead (other than the presence of children, which is consistently linked to larger numbers of 
adults), are the economic variables.  Income and wealth, for instance, are clearly linked to the 
number of adults.  The relationship between income and the total number of adults is curvilinear. 
 The number of adults declines with income, but less sharply as income rises.  When we add in 
asset levels (model 2), we see that higher asset levels are linked to fewer adults.  
TABLE 9 AROUND HERE 
Subsidies matter too, and in the direction we predicted.  Certainly, receipt of food stamps 
is strongly linked to fewer adults.14  The coefficients on SSI and public assistance are 
                                                 
14This is not simply an income effect.  When we add food stamps income into total 




insignificant, but this is partly due to their high correlation with food stamps, which makes it 
impossible to identify independent effects for all three variables.  Most people who participate in 
these transfer programs also get food stamps.  (The correlation between receipt of food stamps 
and public assistance, for instance,  is 0.75.)  When we drop food stamps from the regressions, 
the coefficient on public assistance becomes consistently negative and significant and the 
coefficient on SSI becomes consistently negative and sometimes significant. 
Housing subsidies also appear to make households smaller.  As expected, receipt of 
Section 8 subsidies is also linked to fewer adults, and the results suggest that households living 
in rent controlled apartments are smaller too, at  least until the last model, when the  house 
variable is included in the regression.  It may be that rent control is masking an apartment effect, 
but it may also be that the high correlations among these variables make it impossible to identify 
independent effects.  The coefficient on Jiggetts is not significant, but this may be due to the 
very small number of households in our sample who report receiving assistance through Jiggetts. 
  The results also suggest that households living in public housing have fewer adults, 
ceteris paribus, while homeowners and households living in a house, as opposed to an apartment, 
tend to have more adults.  As discussed, one cannot draw causal inferences about the effects of 
ownership and single-family homes, however, since owner-occupied units and units in houses 
are in fact larger on average than rental units and those in apartment buildings.      
The magnitude of these effects are quite large.  Consider the average household receiving 
a Section 8 rental subsidy; its expected number of adults falls from 1.90 to 1.72 when the 
household receives a rent voucher.  For the typical household receiving food stamps, its expected 
number of adults falls by 18 percent, from 2.1 to 1.73, when the household receives food stamps. 
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  These probabilities translate into a significant shift in housing demand.  Our estimates suggest 
that the 393 households in our sample receiving food stamps would occupy 70 fewer housing 
units in the absence of the food stamp program.  The 210 households receiving Section 8 would 
demand 20 fewer housing units in the absence of Section 8 subsidies.15  
                                                 
15To arrive at these estimates (using the example of Section 8), we first calculated (for the 
average household receiving a Section 8 subsidy) the expected number of adults with and 
without the rental subsidy.  We then multiplied this difference by the total number of households 
in the sample receiving Section 8 to get an estimate of the total number of people who have to 
find housing units as a result of Section 8.  We then divided this number of people by expected 
household size without section 8 for a rough estimate of how much Section 8 shifts the demand 
curve for housing.  
When we consider the determinants of the number of adults, other than the respondent 
and partner (table 10), we see that the coefficients on some of the race and nativity variables are 
statistically significant in the first two models.  Until we control for household assets, the 
coefficients on black, Hispanic, and foreign-born are positive and statistically significant.  Once 
we control for assets, however, these coefficients no longer emerge significant, suggesting that 
differences in asset levels may explain the apparent racial differences. 
The effects of income and assets are largely the same here - higher incomes and wealth 
are linked to fewer adults (though again in the case of income, the effect is predicted to diminish 
and ultimately reverse as incomes rise).  The presence of children does not appear to matter here, 
at least once the presence of a partner or spouse is taken into account.  Finally, the effects of 
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subsidies are largely the same - subsidies (in particular, food stamps, section 8, rent control, and 
public housing) are linked to fewer other adults.  And once again, homeownership and living in a 
house are positively associated with a greater number of other adults.    
The presence of a partner or spouse is strongly associated with a smaller number of 
other adults.  If you live with a partner or a spouse, you are far less likely to live with another 
adult relative or unrelated adult.  These other adults, in other words, appear to be substitutes to 
some extent, for partners or spouses.  
 
5.  Normative analysis 
Are households in New York the right size?  We have seen household size growing--
should we be happy about this, sad about it, or indifferent? Can different policies affect 
household size in ways that create potential Pareto improvements?  In this section we will follow 
the positive analysis of the last several sections with the beginning of a normative analysis. 
 
A.  Why share housing? 
Housing serves many purposes, and for many of those purposes, increasing returns to 
scale operate.  Policies that reduce household size force people to forgo these increasing returns 
to scale; they make housing more expensive. 
The most obvious source of increasing returns to scale comes in the use of houses as 
shelter--protecting residents and their possessions from weather and marauding animals, both 
human and non-human.  The cost of shelter is basically the cost of building a box.  The output of 
box-building is the number of cubic feet enclosed within the box, since this determines the 
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number of people who can take refuge within the box and use it to protect their possessions.  
Hence the (2/3)-rule from engineering applies: cost is proportional to output to the (2/3) power.  
Doubling the number of people a box or house can shelter increases the cost of building that box 
by roughly 59 percent. 
This argument also applies to many consumer goods.  Refrigerator construction obeys the 
(2/3)-rule; so do furnace and air conditioner construction.  Closets, desks, and dressers are just 
boxes, too; so are pots, ovens, dishwashers, clothes washers and dryers, and microwaves. 
Similar geometric considerations also point to increasing returns to scale in the 
connections households have to many utilities.  Houses serve as the means for households to 
receive mail, electricity, water, cable TV, television, and broadband, and to dispose of sewage.  
Doubling the capacity of these connections generally requires far less than doubling the cost of 
construction.  A water pipe, for instance, with a 41 percent greater diameter carries twice as 
much water per minute.  A single antenna or satellite dish can serve two television sets. 
Food, also, can be purchased more cheaply in bulk.  Food packaging obeys the (2/3)-rule, 
and packaging costs represent a substantial portion of retail food prices.  Some foods naturally 
occur in large sizes (or, because of the (2/3)-rule, are prepared in large batches), and larger 
households internalize the cost of splitting up these foods, and probably do it better than 
commercial entities. 
Other economies of scale come from better scheduling.  A second person in a heated or 
air-conditioned room imposes very little additional cost on the heating or ventilating system, and 
a room used continuously for two hours at 70 degrees Fahrenheit  is not twice as expensive to 
heat or cool as the same room maintained at 70 degrees for one hour.  Lazear and Michael (1980, 
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p. 92) point out some goods are public within a household: their consumption by one member 
does not diminish their availability to other members.  Examples abound: electric light in a 
room, the beauty of art work on the wall, the security provided by a locked bolt on the door, etc. 
 
Most people spend most of their time outside of their residences, and even when they are 
home, people are not always using the couch, the comfortable chair, the can-opener, the kitchen, 
the bed, the bathroom, and the computer simultaneously.  Because of this down-time, doubling a 
household’s size does not require doubling the household’s stock of consumer durables in order 
to maintain the same standard of availability. 
Scheduling also helps in food preparation.  Unlike a supermarket, a household with 
several people in it does not have to worry about who will eat the second half of a can of soup.  
Food preparation is also less time-consuming: cooking a meal for three takes little more time 
than cooking a meal for one. 
Household economies of scale come from specialization and assignment according to 
comparative advantage, too.  The size of these economies within households is probably quite 
limited on average, however.  Market production rather than household production is likely to 
dominate activities with great economies of specialization. 
Finally, there are great advantages from living with other people, aside from any 
reduction in cost.  Some things are just easier with more people.  Moving a sofa any great 
distance by yourself is extremely difficult, but with two people it is very easy.  Sharing a house 
provides insurance, both against income uncertainty and health uncertainty (it’s nice to have 
someone around to take care of you when you are sick and to call the ambulance in an 
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emergency).   For many people loneliness is a great psychological burden.  People acquire 
animal companions and lavish care upon them partially to offset loneliness, but non-human 
animals are not perfect substitutes for humans (even if they never hog the shower when their 
human companions want to use it).  Some people derive great joy from the presence of a  
particular other person.   
The need for companions is particularly strong for children.  Children can suffer greatly 
in the absence of adult supervision.  Children are likely better off when several adults are around 
to help them out.  McPherson and Stewart (1991), for instance, cite the advantages for child care 
of having several adults in a household.  Munroe and Munroe (1971) found that infants in more 
crowded households were held more often and were responded to more quickly than infants in 
less crowded households.  This work was carried out in Kenya. 
Most of these services, of course, could be performed for money by someone outside the 
household who left when he or she was done performing them.  By the same token, unused time 
for a household’s can-opener or sofa could be leased on the spot market.  Transactions costs--not 
the least of which is the transportation of an outsider to call the ambulance or use the can-
opener--are often a formidable barrier to such outside dealings, however. 
 
B.  Empirical evidence on economies of scale 
Economies of scale in household operation have been the subject of extensive empirical 
study, although most of this study has not used this term (exceptions are Lazear and Michael 
[1980] and Nelson [1988]). 
Economies of scale in household operation are more difficult to measure than economies 
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of scale in firm operation because the output of households is more difficult to conceptualize 
and to observe.  Two different approaches have been taken to this problem.  One approach has 
been to rely on expert opinion about what sorts of goods households of various sizes should have 
in order to achieve what the experts feel are decent ways of living.  This approach is most 
frequently used by governments when they attempt to make regulations to treat households of 
different sizes similarly.  We call this the expert approach.  The other approach, more 
favored by economists, is to use the indirect evidence of expenditure patterns to infer the levels 
of income needed to keep utility-maximizing households just as well off as their size 
changes.  Many controversies have arisen among practitioners in this field about what just as 
well off means: whether it refers to desire-satisfaction, for instance, or some different measure 
of well-being; and whether the household’s well-being refers to that of its head or to some 
social welfare function including the well-being of all members, including children.  We call this 
the economist approach.  See Nelson (1993) for an illuminating discussion of these issues. 
Studies also differ in whether they concentrate on just one aspect of household 
consumption, or on total expenditure.  Among the studies that concentrate on single aspects, 
those on food and housing are most important. 
For food, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has calculated the cost of 
purchasing a Thrifty Food Plan for households of various sizes, and uses this as the basis for 
making payments under the Food Stamp program.  This is an expert study.  The idea is that if 
two households of different sizes both spend wisely the Thrifty Food plan amount for food, and 
share reasonably, members of both households will eat equally well, and minimally 
adequately, as both of these terms are judged by USDA experts.  Table 11 shows the per person 
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cost of the Thrifty Food Plan for households of different sizes, all expressed as a ratio to the cost 
for a one person household. 
Table 11 also shows the results of an economist approach study to food expenditure, that 
of Nelson (1988), and shows what food expenditures would be if costs followed the (2/3)-rule.  
Both Nelson and the USDA results suggest definite economies of scale, with Nelson showing 
much larger economies.  As household size increases, USDA per person costs fall more slowly 
than the (2/3)-rule, while Nelson’s per person costs fall considerably faster. 
TABLE 11 AROUND HERE 
Since food accounts for about 12 percent of the expenditures of the average one-person 
household in 1999, moving in with another person and sharing food saves about 1 percent of 
total expenditure, using the USDA estimates (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 2001, table 660).  
Nelson’s estimates would indicate a savings more than four times as large. 
For housing, the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) does not 
set similar standards directly, but determines fair market rentals (FMRs) for various kinds of 
apartments under the section 8 program, and local housing authorities decide the size of 
households that will be permitted in which apartments.  Implicitly these two steps create a rental 
cost per person for households of different sizes.  Table 12 shows these relative costs for New 
York City (and Rockland and Putnam counties) for fiscal year 2002.  As noted, the New York 
City Housing Authority’s (NYCHA) occupancy standards specify two different apartment sizes 
for some household sizes, depending on gender compositions  (see table 6).  Thus in table 12 we 
show different costs per person for some household sizes.  We also present Nelson’s housing 
estimates, and the (2/3) rule for comparison. 
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TABLE 12 AROUND HERE 
Not surprisingly, economies of scale in housing are much greater than economies of scale 
in food.  By every estimate, they are greater than the economies implied by the (2/3)-rule.  The 
average one-person household devotes about 30 percent of its expenditures to shelter and 
utilities, and so doubling up saves about 11 percent of expenditure on the more conservative 
HUD-NYCHA estimate.  It saves about twice as much on Nelson’s estimate. 
Finally, there have been many attempts to construct estimates of total expenditure.  The 
best known of these is the Orshansky poverty scale, a product of the expert approach (for a 
discussion of the Orshansky scale and its history, see Nelson [1993]).  More influential are the 
USDA eligibility standards for food stamps, also a product of the expert approach.  Exactly what 
these standards measure is unclear, but is probably best thought of as the minimum expenditure 
needed to be well off enough not to merit government assistance, or the minimum expenditure 
required for basic needs.  Table 13 shows the relative per person costs of achieving these levels 
of well-being.  (The food stamp program uses two measures of income, net and gross, to 
establish eligibility, but relative per person costs are the same under both measures.)  This table 
also includes the results of an economist approach study, that of Lazear and Michael (1980). 
TABLE 13 AROUND HERE 
The economies of scale on all three measures are considerably larger than those implied 
by the (2/3)-rule.  Doubling up saves between a third and a half of income. 
All of these studies, both the expert approach and the economist approach, leave out the 
non-pecuniary benefits of large households--companionship, child care and child development, 
insurance, assistance with day-to-day tasks and problems.  In that sense, they greatly 
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underestimate the benefits some people derive from larger households.  The most serious 
weakness in these studies, however, is that they leave out the non-pecuniary costs of larger 
households.  Such costs must be considerable: otherwise no one would live in a small household. 
 These costs will be the subject of the next sub-section. 
Before discussing these non-pecuniary costs, however, it is important to note that the 
economies of scale from household size seem to be captured mostly by the household itself.  
There do not seem to be many large externalities, either positive or negative.  That does not 
mean that household decision making properly recognizes the gains that all member of the 
household realize.  While children are members of the household, they may be incapable of 
recognizing what is in their best interest, or exerting much influence over household decision 
makers.   
Being internalized makes these economies of scale no less real and no less substantial.  
Some transfer programs seem to be designed to offset them.  Pendakur (1999, p. 2), for instance, 
writes, An accurate equivalence scale may allow decision makers to design transfer programs 
that do not create incentives for program participants to change their household type to increase 
their level of welfare.  Designing transfer programs so that participants have no incentives to 
choose better household sizes seems no more sensible than designing programs so that 
participants have no incentive to refrain from swallowing cleaner fluid or amputating their 
fingers.  Ceteris paribus, transfer programs should encourage participants to realize these 
economies of scale, not try to make them indifferent. 
 
C.  Costs of larger households 
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There are many different non-pecuniary costs of added household size.  Some of them 
can be mitigated by incurring additional costs--often by increasing the amount of space a 
household occupies--but some cannot.  The story we are telling about households is similar to 
the traditional story urban economists tell about cities: they exist because of economies of scale, 
and they are limited in size because of congestion and externalities.  Optimal size of each city 
and each household is determined by the outcome of a battle between scale economies and 
congestion diseconomies. 
The best documented congestion diseconomies are health problems, particularly 
communicable diseases.  Household economies of scale arise from having people in close 
contact with others in the household, sharing consumer goods, and using the same durable 
equipment.  Germs and viruses spread quickly within households.  The bigger the household, the 
greater the exposure each member of it has to diseases spread by other members. 
Most of the medical evidence is about crowding rather than large household size per se.  
But crowding is quite correlated with large household size: in the SIS, if we use the conventional 
definition of crowding as more than one person per room, the correlation between crowding and 
household size is 0.47.  The average crowded household has 5.09 people; the average uncrowded 
household, 2.97.  Thus  we can interpret much of the evidence about crowding  as applying to 
large household size.  The medical literature also concentrates on children rather than adults. 
Children in crowded conditions are more susceptible to respiratory ailments (Mann et al., 
1992), stomach illnesses (Galpin et al., 1992; Mendall and Northfield, 1995), and, among 
Australian Aborigines, cerebro-spinal diseases (Pierce et al., 1995).  Children brought up in 
crowded conditions die younger (Coggon et al., 1993).  There is also some evidence of greater 
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morbidity among adults (Mann et al., 1992; Mendall and Northfield, 1995). 
Because it appears to arise primarily from crowding, the increased susceptibility to 
disease that larger households suffer from can alleviated in part by larger houses.  The literature 
is unclear on this issue.  But larger houses are expensive--just like other measures that reduce the 
risk of infection like vaccines and scrupulous cleanliness.  Moreover, even the largest mansions 
allow personal contact among household members, such as sharing a common mailbox, 
doorknob, or kitchen.  Thus part of the documented costs to health are undoubtedly due to 
household size per se, not just crowding. 
Larger households also expose their members to greater risk of crime.  The walls and 
doors of a house are one of the main forms of protection that people use against criminals, but 
they afford no defense against criminals within the household.  In fact, a great deal of crime 
takes place within households.  In 1999, 14.0 percent of violent crimes occurred in the victim’s 
home--over 900,000 incidents in all (U. S. Department of Justice, 2002a, table 61).  Moreover, 
7.6 percent of violent crime victimizations (not including murder) were attributed to relatives of 
the victim (U. S. Department of Justice, 2002a, table 33).16   About 600 children under five are 
murdered every year, most by their parents, and in 1999,  836 adults were killed by their spouses 
and 743 by boyfriends or girlfriends (U.S. Department of Justice, 2002b).  Aside from violent 
crimes, many thefts occur within households, but no data are available. 
Larger homes may partially reduce the dangers of intra-household crime by alleviating 
some of the pressures of interpersonal contact and by affording moderately good hiding places 
for valuables.  Any such effect, though, is likely to be small. 
                                                 
16We have not included former spouses as among relatives for this tabulation. 
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Large households also face the problem of being unable to reconcile the divergent desires 
of their members for goods that are public within the household.  Basically, a household is going 
to have only one location, only one color house, only one type of stove or brand of washing 
machine, only one mode of celebrating the December holidays.  To the extent that its members 
have divergent views on these matters, somebody will always be disappointed and sometimes 
everybody will be disappointed.  This trade-off between variety and scale economies is well-
known in industrial organization and in studies of fiscal federalism. 
Sorting in household membership mitigates these difficulties, but it does not eliminate 
them.  Households share many goods and attributes, and sorting on one of them is not likely to 
lead to agreement on all.  A household with extremely compatible views about religion may 
include both cat-lovers and people allergic to cats, and a household of dog lovers may find itself 
in serious disagreement about smoking.  Trust, moreover, is critical to household formation, and 
further constrains the degree of sorting that can occur.  Even if two people agree completely 
about pets, religion, kitchen architecture, and the desirability of living near Route 22, they will 
not form a household if one thinks the other is likely to swindle her. 
More rooms and more space allow more variety within a household on some matters, but 
not on all.  A household can eliminate fights over what program to watch if it has enough rooms 
to house multiple television sets and enough money to buy them.  Pets, perhaps, can be confined 
to certain parts of a large house, but stopping dogs from barking is not easy.  On matters like 
location and architectural style, however, more rooms do not provide any added scope for 
variety.  
Living in a large household, especially in a small house, also imposes a series of costs 
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from incessant human contact--loss of privacy, the stress of congestion, the annoyance of 
continual compromises, a feeling of loss of control.  Early animal studies (for example, Dubos 
[1965]; Christian, Flyger and Davis [1960]; and Calhoun [1971]) suggested that crowding could 
have rather grave psychological and physiological consequences, and during the next two 
decades, social psychologists and sociologists studied extensively how crowding affects humans. 
Many of these studies found virtually no effect of crowding.  American naval personnel 
(Dean, Pugh, and Gunderson 1975), Peace Corps volunteers (MacDonald and Oden 1973), Hong 
Kong residents (Mitchell 1971), and children in !Kung communities (Draper 1974) have all been 
found to function excellently under conditions far more crowded than almost anything existing 
in New York today.  While some other studies suggest crowding imposes costs, they used 
unsophisticated ecological correlation techniques that are not currently viewed as very 
convincing (see, for instance, Booth, Welch, and Johnson [1976] and the criticism by Higgins, 
Richards, and Swan [1976]). 
This literature contains more positive, credible results for children and for college 
students than for adults.  Shapiro (1974) found that nursery school boys from high density homes 
exhibited less fine and gross motor competence than boys from low density homes.  This finding 
is consistent with laboratory observations that when children were placed in higher density 
environments, their body movements were inhibited and they played in more passive ways 
(McGrew 1972).  Home density, however, made no difference to motor competence among 
nursery school girls. 
Rodin (1976) found that crowded lower class children showed higher levels of learned 
helplessness and competed even when competition harmed them.  Booth and Edwards (1976) 
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found that crowding increased sibling fights and physical punishment by parents, but had few 
other effects on family relations.  Booth and Johnson (1975) showed that school authorities more 
often contacted the parents of children from high density households about school problems. 
Crowding also seems to reduce cognitive abilities.  College students who were forced to 
triple up in rooms designed for two students saw significant drops in grade point average relative 
to students in less crowded dorm rooms--and the drops disappeared when they returned to two-
student rooms (Karlin, Rosen, and Epstein 1979).  Numerous laboratory studies have shown that 
people perform complex tasks more poorly in crowded environments, but performance on simple 
tasks does not suffer (see, for instance, Nagar [1998] for results and a literature review). 
For adults, the results are less strong.  Only one pathology has been rigorously associated 
with residential crowding: increased rates of psychiatric hospitalization (Freedman, Heshka, and 
Levy 1975; Freedman 1975; Epstein 1981).  In laboratories and in prisons, however, crowding 
can induce physiological reactions indicative of stress, like high blood pressure and palmar 
sweat, and so it may have other deleterious effects on health and general well-being (D’Atri 
1975; Paulus, McCain, and Cox 1978; Cox. Paulus, McCain, and Schkade 1979). 
Finally, large households impose costs on neighbors because they generate more noise, 
more foot and car traffic, and more school children.  More infections within the household also 
imply more infections outside it.  The noise externality can be mitigated by spending money on 
land and thick walls, although the large household has no incentive to do so, absent some form of 
compulsion.  The other externalities are more difficult to mitigate with existing institutions.  But 
for traffic and school children, concentrating attention on a particular neighborhood where a 
large household is located greatly overstates the size of these externalities.  People in this 
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neighborhood would be better off if the large household were broken up and its members 
dispersed more widely, but people in other neighborhoods would be worse off.  Whether the 
traffic and schoolchildren associated with a large household are on net a cost or a benefit to the 
rest of society thus depends on the curvature of the relationship between traffic or schoolchildren 
and external harm.  No a priori answer is possible. 
 
D. Equilibrium, optimality, and market failures 
Despite the presence of modest economies of scale in household formation, markets can 
achieve a reasonably efficient equilibrium under certain conditions.  The case for government 
intervention is built around the failure of these conditions. 
Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer, and Zame (1999) (EGSZ) presents the basic results about 
how markets can assign people to households optimally.  In a world with a continuum of agents 
who both trade goods and join clubs, they show that a competitive equilibrium exists and is 
Pareto optimal.  Households are an example of clubs.  Agents take as given the prices of goods 
as well as the membership fees for various clubs (which can discriminate based on 
characteristics).  Clubs have to be small relative to the measure of agents. 
These results depend on four strong conditions being met: 
(i) Agents care about what clubs they belong to, and about who else belongs to these 
clubs, but membership imposes no obligations beyond paying the fee, which is perfectly 
observable and costlessly verifiable. 




(iii) Externalities may operate among agents in the same club, but nothing that happens 
within a club (which is only joining or not joining) affects agents outside the club. 
(iv) All distortions are eliminable.  Governments and monopolies play no role.  There are 
no taxes or transfers, price floors or ceilings, or goods priced wrongly. 
 
None of these four conditions for the EGSZ result holds for households in New York 
today.  In this section we will consider each condition, examine how it fails and what the 
consequences of its failure are, and ask what sort of policies these market failures imply. 
 
(i) Conditionless club membership with verifiable fees 
The obligations and privileges of household membership in New York are not governed 
by verifiable contracts, for the most part.  At best, households are governed by relational 
contracts, with a few items (inheritiances, divorce terms, gross physical abuse, health insurance 
and some pension terms) subject to review by judicial authorities.  Promises to other members of 
one’s household are generally not enforceable.  The husband who fails to bring home the orange 
juice he promised his wife is not subject to judicial sanction. 
It is easy to see the effect of such limitations on contracting.  In the limit, if no contracts 
of any kind, relational or explicit, were possible on household formation, no households would 
have more than one member.  Households would be inefficiently small.  In general, we should 
think of contracting limitations as working in this direction (although we are aware of no 
theorem that proves this).  Contracting limitations prevent some Pareto-improving increases in 
household size from occurring. 
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Thus governments can often make Pareto improvements possible by enforcing implicit or 
explicit contracts that help households form.  The traditional state support of heterosexual 
monogamous marriages is a good example of such a policy; so is the traditional effort 
governments make to enforce scrupulously the terms of legitimate wills.  In the same vein, 
implicit contract enforcement appears in prosecution of domestic violence cases and collection 
of child support and alimony payments.  If the police arrest and punish perpetrators of domestic 
violence, then women find it easier to live with men whose promise of refraining from violence 
would otherwise be worth very little. 
The optimal terms of laws enforcing implicit or explicit contracts like this are beyond the 
scope of this paper.  So are the questions of whether marriage-like protection should be extended 
to homosexual, polygamous, and polyandrous relationships; and whether adultery should once 
again be a crime.  The important points are that government policies of this type matter, and that 
because they are unlikely to achieve a first-best outcome, households will generally be too small 
on this count. 
 
(ii) Universal utility-maximizing 
The major problem for this condition is children: they often do not know what is in their 
best interest, and they almost never have legal standing to effectuate their choices unilaterally.  
Does this problem cause systematic deviations from Pareto optimality? 
One possibility is that it results in households with too few adults, since children are 
often better off with more caregivers present.17  But having more caregivers is not free: a 
                                                 
17Another possibility is that children are more concentrated in certain households than 
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household  with more adult caregivers must either spend more to acquire more space, or suffer 
from greater crowding.  Both adjustments hurt children: the first hurts indirectly because it 
leaves less money available to spend on other goods; the second hurts directly because crowding 
is bad for children.  Some adults, moreover, are poor caregivers or even child abusers. 
Indiscriminate promotion of households with larger numbers of adults therefore seems 
like a poor policy for addressing this problem. More targeted measures like child support, 
however, can be justified on this basis.  Individuals who because of blood ties may be expected 
to be fairly well-motivated caregivers should be discouraged from leaving households where 
they would be good caregivers.  The same might be true of older siblings. 
 
(iii) No extra-club externalities 
We have already discussed these externalities.  The main negative externalities from 
larger households are faster spread of communicable diseases and bad influences on other 
children if the larger households are deficient in space or caregiving.  The second externality 
merely extends and intensifies the problems that arise because children are legally and 
intellectually incompetent.  Some mentally ill people may also react poorly to living in a large 
household, and those reactions may be bad for themselves or for others, or costly if 
hospitalization is involved. 
                                                                                                                                                             
they would be at an EGSZ equilibrium where they were in fact agents.  The idea here is that 
second and third children who acted as knowledgeable EGSZ agents would arrange to have 
themselves adopted by childless couples more often than actually occurs now.  This notion is 
fairly speculative and no clear policy implications follow from it.  In some ways, the child 
protective system mimics the EGSZ market by removing children from households they would 




(iv) No other distortions 
Household size is a complement or a substitute for many types of consumption that are 
not priced at marginal cost.  Bigger households economize on housing, mail delivery, water, 
heating fuel, food packaging and garbage disposal.  Since these goods are usually underpriced, 
households do not fully internalize the social benefits of larger size.  Transportation (except 
basic car insurance) is usually underpriced, too, but it is not clear how household size affects 
demand for transportation (Nelson [1988] finds some economies of scale, but intuitively the 
more people in a household, the more different destinations to be distant from.) On the other 
hand, food (because of agricultural policies and protectionism) and electricity may be 
overpriced, and larger households economize on these, too.   
Table 14 summarizes our conclusions about the way equilibrium household size is likely 
to deviate from optimal.  The weight of the evidence seems to indicate that household sizes are 
too small, at least as far as the number of adults is concerned, or would be in the absence of state 
intervention.  We have no great confidence in this conclusion, however, since we have arrived at 
it through a great deal of supposition and very little direct evidence.  We have also not 
considered whether state interventions that encourage larger households--family law, domestic 
violence policing, and child support enforcement, for instance--more than compensate for these 
market failures. 
On the other hand, we find little justification for policies that make households smaller -- 




6.   Conclusion 
We have shown that household size responds to policies and to exogenous economic 
forces, and that it has large implications for resource allocation, poverty alleviation, and the way 
we live.  Because household size is important and because it is malleable, wise policies are 
needed.  Many policies, and certainly housing policies, affect household size, but it is not at all 
clear that they are wise. They do not address in any systematic fashion the market failures we 
identified in section 5. 
Of course, many of the policies that discourage large households are based on arguments 
about fairness, not about efficiency.  If a two-person household can meet all its nutritional needs 
with 92 percent as much per capita expenditure as a one-person household, why should the 
government give the two-person household more food stamps than it needs?  Wouldn't it be 
unfair if equally deserving members of two-person households ate better than members of 
one-person households?  Should people who live in small households be disriminated against? 
We have several answers to this argument.  First, some programs like section 8 and 
public housing actually discriminate against large households in the sense that their members are 
less likely to receive any subsidies at all.  A program like food stamps is at least prima facie 
non-discriminatory in that members of large households eat no worse than members of small (the 
government just appropriates whatever savings are realized from economies of scale).  The same 
cannot be said for section 8 and public housing: large households are on average housed worse 
than small, because they are less likely to receive any subsidies at all. 
Second, even if selection probabilities were equalized across household sizes in 
non-universal programs like section 8, public housing, and rent control, we do not see any 
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coherent vision of fairness that informs how these programs operate and that would be violated if 
larger households received better housing.  That is because these programs already discriminate 
against non-recipients, no matter how deserving they might be.  If it is morally acceptable for the 
government to treat small household A, who receives a subsidy, better than small household B, 
who is equally deserving but does not--why is it wrong for the government to treat large 
recipient household C better than A? 
Third, and most fundamentally, even for universal programs, the meaning of "fair 
treatment" for people who have different abilities and opportunities for living with others is not 
clear.  Consider, by way of analogy, how we currently treat people who have pleasant 
dispositions and are easily satisfied with the most meager of possessions, as opposed to those 
who are dour, depressed, materialistic and never satisfied.  People with sunny dispositions are 
clearly better off, at any equal income, than people with sour dispositions, but we do not attempt 
to deprive them of their good luck by taxing them more highly or reducing their food stamp 
allotments (outside of Gulliver's Travels).   
Similarly some people have the good fortune to be able to get along well with others, 
manage in household settings, and operate with little privacy.  Some people are blessed by 
having met someone with whom they want to share their life.  Others are not so lucky.  Should 
the kind of good luck that allows people to flourish in large households be treated like the good 
luck that allows some people to have sunny dispositions (or large inheritances), or the kind of 
luck that brings good health and high-paying jobs? 
We do not profess to have an answer to this question.  Nor do we have answers to a long 
series of questions more closely related to policy:  Why shouldn't food stamp allotments and 
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section 8 budgets be directly proportionate to household size? Why shouldn't "deeming" 
(reducing the grant that recipients receive when they live with non-recipients who have income) 
be eliminated from TANF and SSI?  When doubled-up families appear at the Emergency 
Assistance Unit looking for shelter, why shouldn't their hosts be paid to keep them a few more 
nights, or be promised a subsidized unit for themselves?  Why shouldn't New York City pay 
households to take in "foster adults," rather than placing those adults in shelters?  Why shouldn't 
homeowners' tax preferences be restricted to families with children, or be more generous for 
such households? Why shouldn't aunts, uncles, grandparents and family friends qualify for tax 
benefits when they live in a household with children? 
The purpose of this paper has been to raise these questions (and many more like them), 
and to provide some of the tools for answering them.  Household composition is not immutable 
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Source: 2000 Census of Population.  Adult means 18 years or older. 
 
 
                                                 

































































Source: 1940 data from Current Population Reports, Household and Family Characteristics; 
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Housing Use in New York City, 1999 
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Receiving no food stamps, 


















Mean Number of Adults per 
Household 
 
Mean Number of Adults 

















































































Poisson Regressions of Number of Adults in Household Other than Respondent 


















































































































































































































































































































































































Poisson Regressions of Number of Adults in Household  
other than Respondent and Spouse/Partner 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sources: Fair market rentals: Federal Register, volume 66, number 190, October 1, 2001; page 









































































Sources: Food stamps: U.S. House of Representatives, 1998, p. 931.  Orshansky: Nelson (1993), 

















Lack of input from children  
 








Unclear; maybe too small 
 
